The Role of Mortality Rate in the Transition from
Stagnation to Growth by Davide Fiaschi & Tamara Fioroni
The Role of Mortality Rate in the Transition from
Stagnation to Growth
Davide Fiaschi∗ Tamara Fioroni∗∗
July 1, 2012
Preliminary draft
∗Dipartimento di Economia, Universita` di Pisa, Via Ridolfi 10, Pisa. E-mail address: dfiaschi@ec.unipi.it.
∗∗Dipartmento di Scienze Economiche, Universita` di Verona, Vicolo Campofiore, 2. E-mail address:
tamara.fioroni@univr.it.
1
CONTENTS CONTENTS
Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 The Model 6
2.1 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Consumption and Total Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 Dynamics Within and Between Regimes 11
4 Conclusions 16
A Proof of Proposition 1 20
B Proof of Proposition 2 24
Keywords : Life expectancy, Unified growth theories, Income Growth
JEL code: O10, O40, I20,
2
1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
In literature there is no agreement on which are the main determinants of the extraordinary
development in the last five centuries of Western economies and of the related phenomenon
denoted Great Divergence. Many scholars (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2004) following a literature
starting in 1960’ (see, e.g., Cipolla (1962)) argue that the (differences in the) accumulation
of human capital is the main source of long-run growth, and therefore the root(s) of this
development (and divergence) should be searched in the factors affecting its accumulation.
However, other scholars point to the quality of institutions as the main determinant of the
long-run growth of a country. In one of the most important contributions Acemoglu et al. (2001)
argument that a lower settler mortality, favoring a better quality of institutions, explains the
differences in income between North American and Center and Southern American countries.
These two explanations can be also viewed as complementary, but the prevalence of one or
the other has crucial policy implications. For example, if the quality of institutions is the key
factor of development then the adoption of Western institutions (e.g. democracy) is the main
policy recommendation to poor countries; differently, the attention should be on all the factors
benefiting the accumulation of human capital (e.g. public expenditure in education).
The purpose of this paper is twofold: i) to discuss how changes in mortality, affecting the
accumulation of human (and physical) capital, provides a plausible additional determinant
of the long-run growth of countries; and ii) to reconcile the empirical evidence presented in
Acemoglu et al. (2001) with the explanation that human capital accumulation, and not the
quality of institutions, is the main determinant of long-run growth of countries.
Our theoretical framework explicitly refers to the Unified Growth Theory proposed by Galor
and Weil (2000) and Galor (2005), where long-run growth is the result of accumulation of human
capital and the pattern of development presents three regimes; however, here the transition
from the first regime of stagnation to the third regime of modern growth is jointly driven by
technological progress and by the mortality rate of individuals.
Importantly, following Preston (1975) and Easterlin (2004), changes in mortality rate are
assumed to be exogenous as technological progress; indeed both authors convincingly argue
that, at least for the period we are interested in here (i.e. the period from the 18th to the 20th
century), health improvements are the result of the so-called ”Mortality Revolution”, which it is
counterpart of Industrial Revolution for the improvements in productivity. Moreover, according
to Easterlin (2004), both revolutions have the same source in the Scientific Revolution of the
17th century, with the mortality revolution displaying its main effects one century later with
respect to Industrial Revolution. In Easterlin (2004)’s words: “the Industrial and Mortality
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Revolution are two of a kind. Both mark the onset of accelerated technological change in their
respective fields. Both reflect the cumulation of empirically tested knowledge dating from the
seventeenth century onward. ... In seeking an explanation of both the Industrial and Mortality
Revolution, one must ask what is new on the scene. The answer suggested here is the emergence
and growth of modern science ... ”(see Easterlin, 2004, pp. 99-100).1
The model proceeds along the lines of the theoretical framework presented in Galor and
Moav (2004), where changes in the type of technologies and factors used in the economy char-
acterized the three different regimes. In particular, economy can stay in i) an agricultural
regime, where output is produced with an agricultural technology, whose factors are unskilled
labour and land; ii) in a pre-modern-growth regime, where output is produced using only phys-
ical capital and unskilled labour in an industrial sector; and iii) in a modern-growth regime
where both physical and human capital are used in the industrial sector. The transition from
a regime to another depends on the change in the relative productivity of agricultural and
modern technology and on the stock of physical and human capital in the economy.
The accumulation of physical and human capital is the result of choice of agents living
potentially for two periods: childhood and adulthood. Every adult has just one child, but the
size of population inversely varies with the mortality rate.2 Every agent devotes the first period
of her life to the acquisition of human capital (if any) and in the second period she employs
her human capital and inherited wealth, i.e. physical capital, in production and allocate the
resulting income between consumption and a bequest for her offspring (this bequest is positive
only other a given threshold of income).
Parents choose to allocate this bequest between the finance of offspring’s education and
a transfer devoted to finance the future wealth of offspring, in order to maximize the future
income of children.
We assume that people potentially live two periods: childhood and adulthood. Childhood
is a certainty and the risk of mortality occurs in adulthood 3 .
The optimal investment in human capital is always decreasing in the mortality rate, since a
higher mortality rate decreases the return on investing in education (the agent has less time to
recover from her investment). However, a decrease in mortality rate has two opposite effects on
the amount of inherited wealth. On one hand, it raises the consumption of parent reducing the
1The idea that Industrial Revolution is mainly the result of a cultural revolution caused by the emergence
of the new scientific method elaborated in the 17th century (which particularly permeated the English society
in the 18th and 19 centuries) has strong advocates; see for a discussion Mokyr (1999).
2It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case of a growth rate of population dependent of mortality
rate by assuming more than one child for every adult.
3The possibility to die also in the childhood is out of the scope of the paper.
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amount of transfer to offspring; on the other hand, it also increases labour income and hence
the transfer. We show that at low level of income (i.e. in the agricultural and pre-modern
regimes) the first effect can dominate the second and induces a reduction in the bequest to
offspring and therefore in the capital available in the economy. This result is in line with the
empirical evidence discussed in Cervellati and Sunde, 2011 on nonlinear relationship between
life expectancy and growth rate of per capita income
An economy with a low productivity in the industrial sector (with respect to agricultural
sector) and a high mortality rate is deemed to stay in the agricultural regime, where the
very low income allows for a limited bequest entirely concentrated in a direct transfer given
the low return of the investment in education and where such transfer is not invested in the
industrial technology because not sufficiently productive with respect to agricultural technology;
a raise in the productivity of industrial sector can push the economy in the pre-modern-growth
regime, where wage (for unskilled labour) in the industrial sector are expected higher than in
the agricultural sector even though a low stock of capital. As discussed above, the impact
of a possible fall in mortality rate on this dynamic is ambiguous : at low levels of income,
it could decrease inherited wealth and therefore act as a counterbalancing force with respect
to the increase of productivity of the industrial sector. In particular, we find that under
plausible assumptions the rise in life expectancy, at low levels of income, has a positive effect
on intergenerational transfers only if remains within a certain threshold, then it can have a
favorable effect and push an economy towards a pre-modern regime. On the other hand, if
longevity exceeds this threshold, then it may have a negative effect on economic growth and
the economy can be pushed back to an agricultural regime.
Finally, at high levels of income, the rise in life expectancy always allows the transition
from a pre-modern-growth regime to a modern-growth regime. Thus, at high levels of income
both the increase in the productivity of industrial technology and the decrease in mortality rate
increases the size of bequest and the incentive to invest in human capital by raising the wage of
skilled workers. This is caused both by the increases in the stock of capital and by the longer
period agent can have to recover from her investment. Therefore, in this regime the positive
effect on country’s income by the Industrial and by the Mortality revolutions should reinforce
one another.
Our work is related to a large body of recent literature that analyzes the interaction between
human capital formation and the rise in life expectancy in the process of development. Cervel-
lati and Sunde (2005), Boucekkine et al. (2003) focus on the reinforcing interaction between
life expectancy and human capital accumulation in the transition from stagnation to growth.
Hazan and Zoabi (2006) show that the complementarity between health and education in the
5
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production of human capital is crucial to generate the quantity - quality trade off and therefore
the transition from stagnation to growth. Others theoretical contributions suggest that the
decline in mortality rates can increase the return to investment in human capital via: (a) a
prolongation of life that rising the period in which individuals may receive returns on their
investment promotes investment in human capital (Soares, 2005; De la Croix and Licandro,
1999), (b) a high population density which rises the efficiency in human capital production
through an increase in the spread of knowledge (Lagerlof, 2003), (b) the increase in population
growth and in the advancement of skill-biased technologies (Weisdorf, 2004).
The interaction between mortality rates and economic development is also the focus of
many empirical studies. Lorentzen et al. (2008), Bloom et al. (2004), Bloom and Canning
(2005) among others, find a positive effect of life expectancy on economic growth. In the
other hand, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) shows that the rise in life expectancy leading to a
significant increase in population which is not sufficiently compensated by the reduction in the
birth rates, has a negative effect on income per capita.
The paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 analyses the devel-
opment process; and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
To measure the effect of mortality reductions on growth we extend the framework presented in
Galor and Moav (2004). We consider an economy populated by an overlapping generations of
people who potentially live for two periods: childhood and adulthood. They live in childhood
for sure but are subjected to a mortality risk (1 − p) ∈ (0, 1) during the adulthood. More
specifically, p defines the probability for an individual belonging to cohort t of reaching the end
of period t+ 1. In every period t labour force consists of pLt workers and each worker receives
a labour income which rises with p.
2.1 Production
In every period, the economy produces a single material good, the price of which is normalized
to 1. Production may take place with two different methods: an agricultural technology that
employs unskilled labour and land, and an industrial technology that employs physical capital
and skilled labour.
We assume that in the early stage of development the industrial technology is too inefficient
to be used and production is conducted using the agricultural technology. However, in the
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process of development the productivity of the industrial technology grows faster than that
of the agricultural technology and at some point becomes profitable to employ the industrial
technology. Thus, the industrial technology will replace the agricultural technology and the
process of modernization begins.
The agricultural production function is given by:
Y at = A
a(pLt)
1−λ(T )λ, (1)
where Aa is a productivity parameter, pLt is the supply of unskilled labour and T is the quantity
of land which is normalized to 1 for simplicity.
The industrial production function is given by:
Y mt = A(pHt)
1−αKαt = Ap
1−αHtkαt , (2)
where kt = Kt/Ht, α ∈ (0, 1) and A > 0 is a technological parameter. Note that pHt with
Ht = htLt is the aggregate level of human capital given by the individual level of human capital
ht and labour force pLt. As established below human capital increases with the resources
invested in education and when these resources are zero Ht = Lt.
The problem of producers is to maximize profits subject to the production function. When
agricultural technology is operating, in absence of property rights to land, workers receive their
average product :
wat = A
a(pLt)
−λ. (3)
When industrial technology is operating, producers choose the level of physical capital Kt
and the efficiency units of labour Ht such that {Kt, Ht} = arg max [Ap1−αHtkαt −wpHt−rtKt].
Thus, the rate of return to capital rt and the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor wt are given
by:
rt = αAp
1−αkα−1t ; (4)
wmt = (1− α)Ap−αkαt . (5)
We assume that in the early stage of development production is conducted using the old tech-
nology since the productivity of the new technology A is lower than the productivity of the
old technology Aa (see Galor and Mountford (2008)). The economy will start to employ the
new technology when the value of the marginal product of unskilled workers using the new
technology, (1− α)Ap−αkαt is at least high as that of unskilled workers using the agricultural
technology (1 − λ)Aap−λ(Lt)−λ. Therefore production will be conducted using the new tech-
nology when:
kt ≥ ko,
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where:
ko =
[(
1− λ
1− α
)
Aa
A
pα−λ(Lt)−λ
]1/α
. (6)
Notice that the effect of higher life expectancy on the threshold level ko is ambiguous and
depends on the relationship between α and λ. In order to reduce the number of possible
scenarios we assume that
Assumption 1
α > λ.
2.2 Consumption and Total Transfers
We consider an overlapping generations economy where agents live in childhood and as adults.
As established above, adults have a probability p ∈ (0, 1) of surviving during the second period.
Each individual has a single parent and a single child and adult population in period t is
normalized to 1. They care about consumption ct+1 and a transfer to the offspring bt+1. The
expected utility function is therefore4:
U = p[(1− β) log(ct+1) + β log(bt+1 + θ)], (8)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and θ > 0 implies that children receive a positive transfer
only when parent’s income is sufficiently high (see Eq. (14) below).
Agents devote the first period of their lives to the acquisition of human capital. In particular,
human capital of children is an increasing function of expected level of education that parents
give to the offspring, i.e pet, that is:
ht+1 = (1 + pet)
γ (9)
where h(0) = 1, h′(0) = γ and lim
et→∞
h′(pet) = 0 (Galor and Moav, 2004, 2006).
In the second period of life agents work and allocate their income between consumption and
a bequest for their children. In particular, income of each agent is given by labor income ωt+1
and an inheritance xt+1 that she received from parents. The expected labour income rises with
4Following Rosen (1988) we assume the expected utility in the second period is given by the utility of state
“life ”given by the utility from consumption and the bequest to the children and the utility of state “death
”given by M which is assumed to be equal to zero for simplicity:
U = p[(1− β) log(ct+1) + β log(bt+1 + θ)] + (1− p)M, (7)
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life expectancy and is given by pwat+1 when agricultural technology is employed and pw
m
t+1ht+1
when industrial technology is employed. Therefore, individuals’ second period income yt+1 is:
yt+1 = ωt+1 + xt+1, (10)
Parents allocate this income between consumption pct+1 and a transfer to the offspring pbt+1:
yt+1 = pct+1 + pbt+1, (11)
where bt+1 ≥ 0. As established below parents allocate the expected transfer pbt+1 between
the spending in children’s education pet+1 and an amount pst+1 which they save for the future
wealth of children . Thus the inheritance xt+1 which agents receive in the adult age is given by
return on parents’ saving:
xt+1 = pstRt+1 = p(bt − et)Rt+1, (12)
where due to complete capital depreciation, i.e. δ = 1, Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 − δ = rt+1. Thus when
agricultural technology is operating Rt+1 = 0.
Parents choose the level of consumption and the level of transfer to the offspring so as to
maximize their expected utility subject to the budget constraint (11) :
ct+1 =
{
yt+1
p
if yt+1 ≤ µpθ
µ(yt+1+pθ)
p(1+µ)
if yt+1 > µpθ
, (13)
bt+1 =
{
0 if yt+1 ≤ µpθ
yt+1−µpθ
p(1+µ)
if yt+1 > µpθ
, (14)
where µ ≡ (1− β) /β. Note that there is an interior solution for the optimal transfer only
if parents’ income is sufficiently high, i.e. yt+1 > µpθ, otherwise parents devote their income
totally to the consumption.
Parents choose the allocation of optimal transfer to the spending in children’s education in
order to maximize the future income of children i.e. yt+1. Thus from equations (10) and (12)
it follows that:
e∗t = arg max
et∈[0,bt]
[pwmt+1h(pet) + p(bt − et)Rt+1],
which using Equations (4), (5) and (9) yields the following optimal level of education:
et =

0 if 0 < kt+1 ≤ k˜;
1
p
[(
kt+1
k˜
) 1
1−γ − 1
]
if kt+1 > k˜,
(15)
where:
k˜ =
α
(1− α)γ . (16)
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Hence, there is an interior solution for the optimal education choice only if the capital labour
ratio in period t+ 1 is sufficiently high, that is kt+1 > k˜.
Given that in the early stages of development, i.e. kt < k
o, there is no demand for skilled
individuals and the proportion of skilled labour in the labour force is zero, it seems reasonable
to assume that:
Assumption 2
ko < k˜, (17)
which holds if:
A > AMIN =
[
(1− α) γ
α
]α(
1− λ
1− α
)
Aopα−λ(Lt)−β. (18)
2.3 Equilibrium
The amount of transfer bt+1 and his allocation between education spending and the saving for
the future wealth of children determine the aggregate level of physical capital Kt+1 and human
capital H¯t+1:
Kt+1 = pst = p(bt − et), (19)
Ht+1 = h(pet),
where Thus the capital-labour ratio kt+1 is given:
kt+1 =
p(bt − et)
h(pet)
. (20)
Substituting equation (20) into equation (15) we get the following relationship between the
expected education spending, i.e. e¯t = pet and the expected intergenerational transfer, i.e.
b¯t = pbt
e¯t =
{
0 if 0 < b¯t ≤ k˜;
b¯t−k˜
1+k˜
if b¯t > k˜,
(21)
Notice that a higher adult longevity, lowers the threshold level k˜ and hence rises the optimal
amount of education.
Thus, parents choose to invest in children education only if the expected intergenerational
transfer b¯t is sufficiently high otherwise the optimal choice for education e¯t is zero. This implies
10
3 DYNAMICS WITHIN AND BETWEEN REGIMES
that the expected amount which parents save for the future wealth of children, i.e. s¯t = pst, is
given:
s¯t =
 b¯t if 0 < b¯t ≤ k˜;k˜(1+b¯t)
1+k˜
if b¯t > k˜.
(22)
Therefore, when bequest is 0 < bt ≤ k˜ the optimal choice for education is zero and total
transfer is devoted to finance future wealth of children. When bequest is bt > k˜, both et and st
increase with respect to bt.
Equations (20) and (22) imply that the capital-labor ratio in period t is determined by the
amount of transfer in period t, that is:
kt+1 = k(bt), (23)
thus we can define ko = bo and k˜ = b˜.
Using equations Equations (3)-(5), (14) and (21) we can characterize the dynamic of ex-
pected transfers for each child in period t+1, i.e. b¯t+1, as function of intergenerational transfers
in the preceding period :
b¯t+1 =

max[(Aap1−λ − µpθ)/(1 + µ), 0] if b¯t ∈ [0, bo);
(Ap1−αb¯t
α − µθp)/(1 + µ) if b¯t ∈ [bo, b˜);
[
Ap1−αb˜α
(
1+b¯t
1+b˜
)γ(1−α)+α
− µθp
]
/(1 + µ) if b¯t ∈ [b˜,+∞).
(24)
The three ranges of b¯t identify the three distinct regimes: the agricultural regime, i.e.
b¯t ∈ [0, bo) , where production is conducted using agricultural technology, whose factors are
unskilled labour and land; a pre-modern-growth regime b¯t ∈ [0, bo), where output is the result
of using physical capital and unskilled labour in an industrial sector; and a modern-growth
regime, i.e. b¯t ∈ [0, bo) where both physical and human capital are used in the industrial sector.
3 Dynamics Within and Between Regimes
The dynamics of economics within each regime and the transition through the three regimes
depend on the different combinations of technology and survival probability (see figure 1 ). The
following proposition characterizes the dynamic of total transfer within each regime.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions (1), (2) and assuming A
a
(1−λ)µ < θ <
(1+µ)
γµ
:
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A
p
Amin
0
1
AI
AII
A
pI p
A˜
Amax
one stable equilibrium
Regime III
one stable equilibrium
Regime II
one stable equilibrium
Regime I
1 eq. Reg. I, 1 eq. Reg.
II
1 eq. Reg. I, 2 eq. Regime II
Figure 1: Dynamics between and within regimes
• An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in regime I if A < A for 0 ≤ p < p and
A < A˜ for p < p ≤ 1.
• An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in regime II if AI < A < AII .
• An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in regime III if A > AII .
Proof. see Appendix A
At early stages of development, in an agricultural regimes, when technology is relatively low,
the industrial technology is latent and the economy stagnates. The low level of income results
in a zero or a very low bequest which is not invested in industrial technology because it is not
sufficiently productive compared to agricultural technology. Therefore, the economy converges
to a stable equilibrium, i.e. EL in which there is neither investment in physical capital nor in
human capital (see figure 2).
The rise in productivity of the industrial sector, can lead to three phases. As long as it
is relatively low, i.e. A < AI , the dynamic of total transfers show multiple equilibria: if the
12
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bt+1
btbo b˜
EL
Figure 2: One Stable Equilibrium
Regime I
bt+1
bt
b˜bo bK
Ek
Figure 3: One Stable Equilibrium
Regime II
initial level of bt is low, i.e. bt < b
L, it will not be profitable to use industrial technology,
therefore the intergenerational transfers contract over time and the system converges to the
stable equilibrium EL. If bt > b
L then the economy begins to accumulate physical capital and
converges to the stable equilibrium i.e. EK where the evolution of output is driven by physical
capital accumulation (see figure 5). As the productivity of the industrial sector continues to
grow, the unstable equilibrium vanishes (see figure 6). When industrial technology becomes
sufficiently productive, i.e. A > AI , regardless of the initial level of bequest, it will become
profitable to use industrial technology, and the economy converges to a stable equilibrium, i.e.
EK , where the evolution of output is driven by physical capital accumulation (see figure 3).
Finally, the further increase in the productivity of industrial technology i.e. A > AII ,
allows the economy to converge to a globally steady state equilibrium EH where the evolution
of output is driven by the accumulation of human capital as well as physical capital (see Figure
4 ).
The reduction of mortality can have important effects on this dynamic. In particular, a
decrease in mortality has two opposing effects on intergenerational transfers. On the one hand,
higher longevity increases consumption by parents, thus reducing transfer to their offspring;
on the other hand, parents who live longer, work for a longer period, thus increasing labor
income and raising transfers to their children. When the initial level of income is sufficiently
high, the second effect always prevails whereas at low levels of income, if longevity increases
above a certain threshold, i.e. p > p the first effect can prevail. If however, longevity re-
mains within a certain threshold, then it can have a positive effect on the intergenerational
transfers thus leading to physical capital accumulation and to a pre-modern regime. The basic
motivation underlying this result is that income increases at decreasing rates with respect to
13
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bt+1
btb˜b
o bH
EH
Figure 4: One Stable Equilibrium Regime III
bt+1
btb
o
b˜
EL
Ek
EkL
bL
Figure 5: Multiple Equilibria (a)
bt+1
btbo b˜
EL
Ek
Figure 6: Multiple Equilibria (b)
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longevity. This implies that when longevity increases above a certain threshold, at low levels of
income, the rise in income is insufficient to compensate the rise in consumption. Reduction in
intergeneration transfer, in turn reduces physical capital accumulation, pushing the economy
towards an agricultural regime. On the other hand, at high levels of income the economy can
accumulate human capital and therefore the rise in longevity always allows a level of income
sufficiently high to compensate for the rise in consumption, thus leading to a modern regime
(see figure 7). Indeed, if income is sufficiently high, the rise in longevity increases the return
on investment in education and therefore high income perpetuates.
The effect of mortality reductions on the intergenerational transfer is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under Assumptions (1), (2) and assuming A
a
(1−λ)µ < θ <
(1+µ)
γµ
, an increase in
longevity always has a positive effect on intergenerational transfer at high levels of income and
a non-linear effect at low levels of income: the effect is positive if longevity remains below a
certain threshold, i.e. ∂bt+1/∂p > 0 if p < p, and is negative, if longevity exceeds that threshold,
i.e. ∂bt+1/∂p < 0 if p > p.
Proof. see Appendix B
Thus mortality reduction has important implications for the transition through the three
regimes (see figure 1). Consider an economy which shows a unique stable equilibrium in Regime
II. If initial income is sufficiently high, the rise in life expectancy triggers a rapid transition
toward the modern-growth regime. The rise in longevity, indeed, ensuring higher returns in
human capital, makes investing in education more profitable. This leads to a higher income
per capita, increasing the intergenerational transfer.
On the other hand, at low levels of income, as long as life expectancy remains within a
certain threshold, i.e. p < p, then it can have a favorable effect and push an economy towards
a pre-modern regime. However, if life expectancy rises above a certain threshold, the low
equilibrium EL may emerge. Thus the economy may be pushed back to an agricultural regime.
These results are in line with the empirical evidence discussed in Cervellati and Sunde,
2011 which show a non linear relationship between life expectancy and economic growth. In
particular, they show that this relationship is negative before the onset of the demographic
transition and strongly positive after its onset. The basic idea behind this results is that
increased life expectancy might have a negative effect on growth in income per capita if it
accelerates population growth.
15
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bt+1
btb˜b
o bK bHbo
′ b
Figure 7: The rise in life expectancy
4 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the role of mortality reductions for economic growth
by accounting for the differential effects of life expectancy during the different phases of eco-
nomic development. According to the existing literature, we find that the rise in technological
progress always allows the transition from stagnation to growth. The rise in longevity can have
important effects on this dynamic. It has a positive effect on intergenerational transfer at high
levels of income and a non-linear effect at low levels of income: this effect is positive if longevity
remains within a certain threshold and becomes negative if longevity exceeds that threshold.
The basic motivation underlying this result is that income increases at decreasing rates with
respect to longevity. Thus if longevity increases above a certain threshold, at low levels of
income, the rise in income is insufficient to compensate the rise in consumption. Reduction in
intergeneration transfer, in turn reduces physical capital accumulation, pushing the economy
towards an agricultural regime. On the other hand, at high income levels, rising longevity
doesn’t has the same opposite effects. The rise in longevity, indeed, increasing the return on
investment in education, stimulates investment in human capital and increases labour income.
Thus the rise in income is sufficiently high to compensate the rise in consumption due to higher
longevity, leading to higher intergenerational transfers.
Thus we show that the rise in life expectancy may have direct effects on economic growth,
although they appear to be non-monotonic and depend in particular, on the level of develop-
ment. When income is sufficiently high, improvements in life expectancy always increase the
16
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probability of transition towards the modern growth regime. However, at low levels of income,
if the rise of longevity exceeds a certain threshold, the economy can be pushed back to a stag-
nation regime.
Two important caveats to our analysis is that we ignore the potential role of endogenous
fertility and endogenous mortality. We choose to not consider endogenous fertility in order
to highlight the central role of mortality decline in the explanation of the observed patterns
of development of the most of Western countries. An extension of the model to include an
endogenous fertility rate should be advised but we argue that it should not substantially affect
the main results of the paper.
With respect the second argument, we argue that the introduction of endogenous mortality
should not affect the qualitative results of the paper but just adding a possible self-reinforcing
mechanism to the transition from a regime to the other.
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A PROOF OF PROPOSITION ??
A Proof of Proposition 1
From equation (14), when b¯t ∈ [0, b0], parents leave a positive bequest to their children if:
Aa > µθpλ (25)
Under assumption 1, simple calculations show that if b¯t+1 > 0 for b¯t ∈ [0, bo] , then it also holds
that b¯t+1 > 0 for each b¯t > b
o. Otherwise if condition (25) doesn’t hold, then for each b¯t > b
o,
the intergenerational transfer will be positive if bt is sufficiently high, that is, bt > bˆ:
bˆ =
µθpα
A
(26)
where bˆ < bo if the following condition holds:
Aa > µθpλ
(
1− α
1− λ
)
(27)
• An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in regime I if technological level is: A < A
when 0 < p < p and A < A˜ when p < p < 1 (see figure 8).
• An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in regime II if AI < A < AII .
• An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in regime III if A > AII .
Proof :
An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in the range bt ∈ [0, bo) if:
lim
bt→bo−
bt+1 ≤ bo,
lim
bt→bo+
bt+1 ≤ bo,
∂bt+1
∂bt
∣∣∣∣
bt=bo
< 1,
lim
bt→b˜−
bt+1 ≤ b˜,
lim
bt→b˜+
bt+1 ≤ b˜,
∂bt+1
∂bt
∣∣∣∣
bt=b˜
< 1,
20
A PROOF OF PROPOSITION ??
A
p
Amin
0
1
AI
AII
A
pI p
A˜
Amax
one stable equilibrium
Regime III
one stable equilibrium
Regime II
one stable equilibrium
Regime I
1 eq. Reg. I, 1 eq. Reg.
II
1 eq. Reg. I, 2 eq. Regime II
Figure 8: Dynamics between and within regimes
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The first condition holds if A < AI
AI =
(
1− λ
1− α
)
Aa
(
1 + µ
Aap
λ(1−α)
α − µθp λα
)α
. (28)
where limp→0AI =∞ and ∂AI/∂p > 0 if:
p > pI =
[
Aa(1− α)
µθ
]1/λ
. (29)
The second condition holds if:
A < A =
(
1− λ
1− α
)
Aa
(
1 + µ
Aa
(
1−λ
1−α
)
p
λ(1−α)
α − µθp λα
)α
, (30)
where limp→0A =∞ and ∂A/∂p > 0 if:
p > p =
[
Aa(1− λ)
µθ
]1/λ
, (31)
which we assume < 1, that is:
Aa <
µθ
1− λ (32)
Simple calculations show that, if assumption 1 holds then AI > A and pI < p.
The third condition holds if:
A < A˜ =
(
1− λ
1− α
)
Aa
[
1 + µ
αAap
λ(1−α)
α
(
1−λ
1−α
)
]α
(33)
The fourth and fifth conditions hold if:
A < AII =
b˜(1 + µ) + µθp
b˜αp1−α
(34)
where limp→0AII =∞ and ∂AII/∂p < 0 if:
γ <
1 + µ
µθ
(35)
Finally, the sixth condition holds if:
A < Amax =
1 + µ
γ(1− α)p1−αb˜α . (36)
We find that A˜ > A if p < p while A˜ < A if p > p.
Moreover, A˜ > Amin if conditions (32) and (35) hold.
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Simple calculations show that Amax > AII if condition (35) holds (that is Amax > AII if
p < (1 + µ)/γµθ which is higher than one if (35) holds).
An economy shows only one stable equilibrium in the range bt ∈ [bo, b˜) if:
lim
bt→bo−
bt+1 ≥ bo,
lim
bt→bo+
bt+1 ≥ bo,
lim
bt→b˜−
bt+1 ≤ b˜,
lim
bt→b˜+
bt+1 ≤ b˜,
∂bt+1
∂bt
∣∣∣∣
bt=b˜
< 1,
The first and the second conditions hold if A > AI . The third condition holds if A < AII .
Finally the fourth condition holds if A < Amax.
An economy shows one stable equilibrium in the range bt ∈ [b˜,∞) if:
lim
bt→bo−
bt+1 ≥ bo,
lim
bt→bo+
bt+1 ≥ bo,
lim
bt→b˜−
bt+1 ≥ b˜,
lim
bt→b˜+
bt+1 ≥ b˜,
The first and second conditions hold if A > AI and the third and the fourth conditions hold if
A > AII .
Finally, when A < A < AI the economy shows a stable equilibrium in Regime I and a stable
equilibrium in Regime II, and for each p < p < 1 and A˜ < A < A the economy shows a stable
equilibrium in Regime I and two equilibria (one stable and one unstable) in Regime II:
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B Proof of Proposition 2
• In the first regime b¯t ∈ [0, b0], ∂bt+1/∂p > 0 if p < p.
• In the second regime, that is for bt ∈ [bo, b˜), ∂bt+1/∂p > 0 if:
bt > b =
[
µθ
A(1− α)
]1/α
p (37)
where b > bo if p > p.
We have that b < bk if:
bt+1(b)− b > 0 (38)
which holds if:
A > Aˆ =
µθ
(1− α)
[
(1 + µ)(1− α)
µθα
]α
(39)
Simple calculations show that, for each p > p, Aˆ < A˜. This would imply that, for each
p > p then b < bk.
• In the third regime, i.e. bt ∈ [b˜,+∞), ∂bt+1/∂p > 0 if:
γ <
1 + µ
µθ
(40)
Proof : In particular ∂bt+1/∂p > 0 for bt ∈ [b˜,+∞) if:
b > bˆ, (41)
where :
bˆ =
µθpα
A(1− α)b˜α
1
γ(1−α)+α
(1 + b˜)− 1, (42)
where b˜ > bˆ if:
A > A∗ =
θµpα
b˜α(1− α) , (43)
where AII > A∗ if:
γ <
1 + µ
µθ
(44)
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